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1 Introduction
For many developing countries government
procurement reform is a key issue, and one which
is, or ought to be, high on the good governance
agenda. Where procurement is conducted in
accordance with sound principles there is the
potential for direct benefits to the economy of a
country; where it is not the door is opened to
corruption, wasteful expenditure, higher prices,
failure to deliver, loss of faith and integrity in the
public sector, and many more ills.
It is not surprising, therefore, that agencies
representing a broad range of interests are drawing
attention to the need to revisit government
procurement policies and practices; one such is the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The only WTO
instrument currently directed at these issues is the
plurilateral Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA). This was first negotiated by
member states at the Tokyo Round and later
revised at the time of the Uruguay Round. As a
plurilateral agreement, membership is voluntary.
But some WTO members want to bring
government procurement fully into the WTO.
While few would argue that reform of government
procurement is undesirable or that improvements
are not needed, there is some disagreement as to
how to approach reform. What improvements are
needed, and how should they be prioritised? Much
depends on the goals to be achieved. In a country
riddled with corruption, procurement reform would
be aimed at eliminating this; in one where there are
socio-economic inequities, it may be directed at
redressing them. The limited resources and capacity
of developing countries necessitate a prioritising of
expenditure, the identification of the goals, and the
most efficient mechanisms for achieving them.
It is in this framework that WTO endeavours to
bring government procurement into the multilateral
fold should be seen. Developing countries may well
be in need of procurement reform, and any
initiative to assist should be welcomed. But a
country’s specific needs and constraints should not
be overlooked in determining which procurement
regime is the most appropriate.
Multilateral rules are in their infancy, with a
considerable lack of clarity even on the goals to be
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achieved. In contrast to the case of agriculture, for
example, it is neither necessary nor feasible to
focus on the appropriateness of special and
differential treatment (SDT) in current or proposed
rules. Rather, the aim of this article is to identify the
key features that need to be present in any
procurement rules negotiated in the WTO, and to
explain why many arrangements could prove to be
not only highly technical, costly and burdensome
on the public sector, but also irrelevant to the ills
faced by a particular country.
This article aims to help developing countries
identify and prioritise their internal procurement
requirements and to assess the extent to which
their goals may be met within the WTO. Only
when they are clear about their own needs can the
costs and benefits of any multilateral agreement be
properly weighed. This is particularly the case
because of the absence of clear direction from the
WTO as to what multilateral negotiations on
procurement reform aim to achieve.
Readers of this article should bear in mind one
caveat: research in this field is very much in its
infancy: Evenett (2002) refers to it as ‘embryonic’. A
number of developing countries at Doha argued that
because of this, meaningful multilateral negotiations
cannot yet commence. They argued that the WTO
should continue discussing and studying the issue of
procurement. A clearer understanding of the issues
is required before negotiations on transparency are
launched. This caution contrasts starkly with the
fast-track approach suggested by some larger WTO
members, such as the United States of America
(USA) and the European Union (EU).
In the event, Doha provided a longer time-frame,
which is to be welcomed. Developing countries won
a window through which to gain a clearer
understanding of how procurement negotiations will
impact upon their developmental and other needs.
2 Multilateralism and government
procurement
2.1 Why should government
procurement be regulated?
If ever there was a topic, which holds up a mirror to
changing attitudes within the WTO, government
procurement must be it. During early General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations,
and for some time thereafter, most member states
took a strong non-interventionist approach to
government procurement, but over the years there
has been a steady watering down of this hands-off
approach. We are now seeing a steady trend towards
an interventionist, regulatory approach. The GATT
expressly excluded government procurement from
its ambit.Most states were unwilling to extend most-
favoured-nation (MFN) or national treatment (NT) to
government imports. At that stage, they wished to
reserve the privilege to procure government goods
and services in whatever manner they saw fit.
Member states routinely applied price preferences for
domestic products, and goods required for
government consumption were often imported on
the basis of political or other ties.
In recent years, voices have been raised against the
additional cost that these discriminatory measures
could impose on the state and therefore the tax-
payer. It has also been argued that the regulation of
government procurement could open new markets
for less developed nations (see, e.g. Commonwealth
Secretariat 2000). These arguments have given
impetus to moves to include procurement matters
in the WTO stable.
Government procurement accounts for a
substantial percentage of world trade. In my home
country, South Africa, government procurement
represents about 13 per cent of GDP and 30 per
cent of all government expenditure (Ministry of
Finance/Ministry of Public Works 1997). In
developing countries, it can often account for
50–70 per cent of imports (Wittig 1999). For
anyone interested in liberalising international
trade, the holes that procurement represents in the
WTO umbrella must appear large.
Thus at first glance the motivation for regulating
procurement on a multilateral level appears patent.
The goal of the WTO is to liberalise and establish
rules for trade, government procurement represents
a large chunk of international trade, and so the
WTO would be falling short if government
procurement were left largely unregulated. Yet what
form of regulation is feasible, and does it
automatically involve liberalisation? What do WTO
members hope to achieve? In order to answer these
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questions it is necessary, first, to provide an overview
of the fora within the WTO where procurement
matters are being canvassed. Thereafter, the
expressed rationale for each one will be discussed.
2.2 The World Trade Organization fora
on procurement
Government procurement is working its way up
the WTO agenda and is currently being addressed
in no fewer than three different fora: the GPA, the
Working Party on the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) Rules, and the Working Group
on Transparency in Government Procurement
(WGTGP). While this multiple approach may
indicate a commitment to grapple with the nuances
of the issues, it could just as easily indicate an
absence of concerted commitment. Certainly the
three-forum approach has led to a fragmentation of
thinking that does not facilitate ready access for
negotiators. Unless and until there is some formal
integration of work, negotiators will have to
familiarise themselves with all three.
The Working Party on GATS Rules, which reports
to the Council on Trade in Services, is dealing with
government procurement in services as provided
for in Article XIII of GATS.1 This is one of the three
negotiating mandates for the renewed negotiations
on GATS that began in 2001. The WGTGP was
formed under a mandate from the Singapore
Ministerial Conference of December 1996. As the
name suggests, the focus of this group is on
transparency issues rather than discrimination,
MFN or NT.
The agreement on government procurement
The first of the three, the GPA, is a plurilateral
agreement, which came into force in 1996. It is
dominated by developed nations; few developing
countries have chosen to join. Signatories have
been conducting on-going negotiations with a view
to extending the ambit of the agreement and
enlarging its membership. It aims to address the
commercial concerns raised by discriminatory
measures. Some developed countries want the
agreement to have an expanded ambit.
The goal of the GPA in regulating government
procurement finds clear expression in its opening
paragraphs:
Recognizing the need for an effective multilateral
framework of rights and obligations with respect
to laws, regulations, procedures and practices
regarding government procurement with a view
to achieving greater liberalization and expansion of
world trade and improving the international
framework for the conduct of world trade;
Recognizing that laws, regulations, procedures
and practices regarding government
procurement should not be prepared, adopted
or applied to foreign or domestic products and
services and to foreign or domestic suppliers so
as to afford protection to domestic products or
services or domestic suppliers and should not
discriminate among foreign products or services or
among foreign suppliers[.]2
In other words, the GPA hopes to achieve greater
liberalisation and expansion of world trade, to
improve the international framework for the
conduct of world trade, to avoid protection of
domestic products, services or supplies or
discrimination against foreign providers of
products, services or supplies. This rationale is
actualised in Article III (National Treatment and
Non-discrimination), which provides as follows:
1. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures
and practices regarding government
procurement covered by this Agreement, each
Party shall provide immediately and
unconditionally to the products, services and
suppliers of other Parties offering products or
services of the Parties, treatment no less
favourable than:
(a) that accorded to domestic products,
services and suppliers; and
(b) that accorded to products, services and
suppliers of any other Party.
2. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures
and practices regarding government procurement
covered by this Agreement, each Party shall
ensure:
(a) that its entities shall not treat a locally
established supplier less favourably than
another locally established supplier on the
basis of the degree of foreign affiliation or
ownership; and
(b) that its entities shall not discriminate against
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locally established suppliers on the basis of the
country of production of the good or service
being supplied, provided that the country of
production is a Party to the Agreement in
accordance with the provisions of Article IV.
Thus all the provisions, including those on
transparency, have non-discrimination as their raison
d’être. The detailed procedural obligations relating to
transparency in tendering (Articles VII to XVI) are
designed to serve the goal of non-discrimination.
Yet this bold allegiance to NT and non-
discrimination is to some extent undermined by
the agreement’s piecemeal application. It allows
signatories to specify the extent to which they will
be bound by its terms.
n States may specify in a schedule, which entities
are to be covered by the agreement.
n All goods are covered, but services (including
construction services) are covered only to the
extent that they are listed.
n Signatories can specify the thresholds above,
which the provisions in the GPA will apply.
n The parties are allowed to provide for
exceptions.
Moreover, there are specific provisions for SDT
allowing developing countries which wish to
maintain discriminatory practices to enter the GPA
through the provisions of Article V. This Article
expressly recognises the need of developing
countries inter alia to ‘promote the establishment or
development of domestic industries including the
development of small-scale and cottage industries
in rural or backwater areas; and economic
development of other sectors of the economy’.
Should a developing country wish to enter through
this door the transparency issue will come to the fore.
There will need to be full disclosure of all relevant
laws, regulations, judicial decisions, administrative
rulings, etc. In other words, allowance is made for
discriminatory practice on condition that it is applied
in a transparent manner. Depending on its extent,
disclosure could impose something of a burden on
developing countries (see below).
These exemptions and limitations make the GPA a
particularly cumbersome agreement. Any state that
wishes to know whether a particular contract is
bound by the GPA needs to check a whole range of
details. First, is the state a signatory, and is the
particular entity bound? Where the contract is for
the supply of a service, the next question is
whether the activity is covered. In all cases, is the
contract threshold higher than that specified by the
party? And: Is the contract excluded by one of the
exceptions?
Thus the only WTO instrument regulating
government procurement, while bold in intent, is
somewhat fractured in actualisation. It has failed to
achieve uniform consensus among its signatories.
Can multilateral negotiations hope to do better and
achieve this consensus? Or does government
procurement encompass so many varied policy and
practical considerations, so many sensitive social
and political issues and so much variation in
domestic practice and procedure as to render it
unsuitable for multilateral regulation?
The working party on the General Agreement on
Trade in Services rules
As is the case under the GPA, the GATS enunciates
the relationship between transparency and market
access in the preamble:
Wishing to establish amultilateral framework of
principles and rules for trade in services with a
view to the expansion of such trade under
conditions of transparency and progressive
liberalization and as a means of promoting the
economic growth of all trading partners and
the development of developing countries ...
Here the primary goal is the expansion of trade.
Transparency is a condition precedent for this
expansion, and is closely related to the opening of
previously closed markets.
The working group on transparency in
government procurement
The WGTGP was given a mandate by the
Singapore Ministerial Conference ‘to conduct a
study on transparency in government procurement
practices, taking into account national policies,
and, based on this study, to develop elements for
inclusion in an appropriate agreement’. While the
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GPA boldly declares the relationship between
transparency and discrimination, theWGTGP is far
more coy. In fact, one of the issues that persistently
raises its head in deliberations is whether the
working group is mandated to consider issues of
discrimination at all, or whether it is strictly limited
to transparency issues. Participants have proposed
various answers to this question.
Some have suggested that a clear distinction should
be made between obligations on transparency on
the one hand, and market access commitments on
the other. This approach argues that potentially
discriminatory mechanisms fall under the mandate
of the WGTGP only insofar as their transparency is
concerned; their discriminatory substance does not
fall under the mandate. The implication is that
nations are free to discriminate as they see fit, as
long as they do so in a transparent manner!
The response to this argument (which has also been
raised in the WGTGP) is that foreign suppliers are
not concerned with transparency for its own sake in
markets to which they have no access. Further, it is
argued, the administrative burden imposed by
transparency obligations is far too weighty to
warrant their application where procurement
opportunities are open only to domestic suppliers.
The logical outcome of this argument is that where
the procurement opportunity is open only to
domestic suppliers there is little need for transparency
disciplines. By contrast, where the market is open to
foreign suppliers the need for transparency is greater.
This leads to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion
that members who open their procurement markets
to international competition will find themselves
burdened with transparency disciplines, while those
that retain discrimination are excused!
These points are made to emphasise that there is a
lack of lucidity on precisely what multilateral
negotiations on transparency would hope to
achieve. Further, they point to the difficulties that
are encountered when attempting to divorce
transparency from discrimination issues. For
developing countries that may have their own
agendas in initiating procurement reform, this lack
of clarity is unfortunate. It is hard to assess the
desirability of reformmeasures when one is unclear
why they are being introduced.
Similar problems arise for the design of appropriate
SDT. To the extent that any rules are limited to
transparency, the goal of SDT might be to relieve
poor states from obligations which, while desirable
in themselves, have a high opportunity cost (the
potential scale of which is elaborated below). If the
rules cover market access, the goal of SDT might
shift inter alia to permit the types of intervention
legitimised by the GPA Article V as noted above. If a
WTO regime were to aim for both transparency and
market access, cross-cutting SDT would be required
in each to avoid a situation, for example, in which
markets were opened only to states able to justify
high levels of formalised procedures for transparency.
2.3 The Doha Declaration
The Doha Declaration appears to resolve the issue:
it expresses a clear divorcing of transparency from
non-discrimination. Paragraph 26 provides that
future negotiations shall be limited to the
transparency aspects and will not restrict the scope
for countries to give preferences to domestic
supplies and suppliers. The declaration goes on to
state that transparency in procurement negotiations
is to be separated from the plurilateral GPA. The
import of this provision is clear: multilateral talks
will proceed on transparency issues alone;
discrimination will not be addressed. As bold as the
GPA is in uniting transparency and discrimination,
so bold is the Doha Declaration in divorcing them.
However, to declare transparency and
discrimination divorced is one thing, to separate
them from each other in theory and practice is
quite another. Furthermore, if discrimination is not
at issue then what is to be achieved through WTO
negotiations on transparency? There are, clearly,
numerous advantages to having transparent
procurement processes, but are these all trade
issues? And, to the extent that they are, can they
best be addressed through a multilateral agreement?
Notwithstanding the express words of the Doha
Declaration, negotiators may well find that the issues
of transparency and non-discrimination are so closely
linked that non-discrimination issues flavour the
outcomes of these, and subsequent, transparency
negotiations. The starting point for any future, more
ambitious, negotiations would be the agreements
already reached in transparency negotiations.
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With this in mind, any negotiations on
transparency need to keep open a weather eye on
the possible implications for subsequent
negotiations on discrimination (and SDT
provisions will need to be framed accordingly).
Moreover, one of the opportunities presented by
negotiations on transparency is that they may force
developing countries to revisit their
(discriminatory or non-transparent) procurement
policies and instruments (Evenett 2002). If the
threat of multilateral negotiations on transparency
achieves little more than forcing countries to assess
critically their procurement policies, much will
have been achieved (albeit not all trade related).
3 Transparency as a means to an
end
Is transparency a goal in and of itself, or is it ameans
to an end? While transparency is clearly desirable,
positive and constructive, it has these characteristics
because it serves certain desirable, positive goals.
These include: undermining corruption, promoting
the integrity and effectiveness of the public service,
competition and value for money, the collection of
reliable data on procurement, good governance and
sound administration and – key for the WTO – the
interest of non-discrimination.
These differing goals may be served by different
regimes on transparency, operating at various
levels. For example, the transparency required to
avoid corruption might be different from that
needed to promote international trade; a
transparency discipline to ensure that all potential
suppliers have access to information will not
necessarily promote the collection of data.
Sometimes a stringent transparency regime is
required and warranted in order to achieve a
particular goal, but in other instances the goal may
not be so important as to justify the most costly,
burdensome regime.
Given limited finance and capacity, developing
countries need to prioritise their procurement
reform measures. Otherwise, the WGTGP could
propose measures that place an immense burden3
on them without necessarily addressing their
priority needs. Their task is complicated by the
lack of clear direction from the WGTGP as to what
it hopes to achieve through multilateral
transparency talks. The Doha Declaration tells us
quite clearly what transparency talks do not hope
to achieve, but still shies away from enunciating
what they will achieve.
This lack of clarity also presents an opportunity.
Developing countries have, now, the chance to
determine what they hope to achieve through
transparency negotiations and to ensure that their
domestic aspirations are included in negotiations.
So, what sorts of function could a multilateral
agreement on transparency provide?
3.1 Domestic benefits of procurement
reform
In recent years attention has, in many countries,
been directed at the spending power of government
and the need to ensure that it is done in accordance
with appropriate principles. Many countries have
set off on a path of procurement reform, often with
the assistance of outside agencies.
When a country embarks on procurement reform it
is usually taking one of two possible routes. The first
is what might be called “true reform”. It aims to deal
with problems within the procurement system which
render it less transparent, more open to corruption,
less cost effective, inequitable or otherwise inefficient
and in need of reform. The second route is what
might be called “reform for development”. It
describes the case when governments wish to use
their spending power in order to achieve certain
socio-economic goals. This could occur in an
environment where the underlying procurement
system is appropriate, cost effective, equitable,
transparent, competitive and generally healthy but
where procurement restructuring is aimed at
achieving certain socio-economic ends.
These two paths are not necessarily divergent. A
country may embark upon both reform of the
procurement system and directing the system at
particular goals. The relationship between the two
paths is neatly illustrated in the South African
Constitution, which is thus far the only
constitution worldwide to regulate procurement. It
provides, in s.217, that:
1. When an organ of state in the national,
provincial or local sphere of government, or
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any other institution identified in national
legislation, contracts for goods or services, it
must do so in accordance with a system which
is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and
cost effective.
2. Sub-section (1) does not prevent the organs of
state or institutions referred to in that sub-
section from implementing a procurement
policy providing for:
(a) categories of preference in the allocation of
contracts; and
(b) the protection or advancement of persons,
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination.
3. National legislation must prescribe a
framework within which the policy referred to
in sub-section (2) must4 be implemented.
The first two sub-sections of this provision neatly
encapsulate the two levels at which procurement
restructuring may be directed:
n Sub-section (1) focuses on internal reform of
the procurement process itself so as to ensure
that there is a procurement system and that it
is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and
cost effective.
n Sub-section (2) allows procurement restructuring
where the goal is to achieve the socio-economic
goal of uplifting those members of the society
who have been disadvantaged by, among other
things, South Africa’s apartheid history.
Reform for development may, for example, be
directed at poverty alleviation programmes, at
sustaining a particular macro-economic policy, at
advancing smaller enterprises or, as is the case in
South Africa, at overcoming the socio-economic
imbalances created by apartheid. These indirect
goals are invariably achieved through some form of
preferencing and with instruments, which are, by
their very nature, discriminatory. There are
numerous forms that this discrimination may take,
some of them transparent, objective and
measurable, others more discretionary.
Thus, in assessing the domestic benefits of a
reformed procurement regime developing countries
will need to determine the ills at which their reform
programme is targeted. Is this true reform in that the
procurement system itself is ill? Is it using a healthy
procurement system to address socio-economic ills
in the society? Or is it a combination of the two?
3.2 Weighing up the procurement
options
Unless multilateral rules are specifically tailored to
developing country needs, they will not necessarily
be the cheapest or the most effective means of
achieving particular goals. The problem is illustrated
by the example of corruption. One country riddled
with corruption might determine that the most
appropriate way of overcoming it is not to place
additional burdens on an already overworked public
sector, but to form an independent anti-corruption
agency; to introduce a charter of ethics; to send
officials on training courses; to introduce a system
for the protection of whistle blowers, etc. Another
country might decide that, in its case, the problems
arise from inadequate policing of the procurement
system, and might decide to allocate funds to
monitoring, policing and reform of the criminal
justice system. A third country might determine that
the corruption results from inadequate legislation,
and a fourth country might feel that its problems are
the result of all of these.
Since the potential solutions to corruption are as
many and varied as are causes, the implication is that
any WTO rules should provide a broad enabling
framework legitimising a wide range of approaches.
This is, in truth, the norm in many parts of theWTO
texts (not least Article V of the GPA, and see also the
provisions on agriculture as described by
Michalopoulos, this volume). But the obverse is that
the gains to be obtained from a WTO regulation may
be reduced correspondingly. For example, while
bribery and corruption are on the WGTGP’s list of
“Issues Raised and Points Made”, the strong view
expressed in its deliberations is that they do not fall
within its mandate. Thus, a developing country
which wishes to use procurement reform to address
issues of corruption may well find that the topic
does not come into the deliberations, still less the
subtleties in approach required to cure ills.
If anti-corruption reform initiatives are required
separately from any multilateral reform, developing
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countries will need to ensure that no conflict exists
between the requirements of their internal anti-
corruption initiatives and a multilateral agreement.
At the very least it seems potentially over-
burdensome to require procurement anti-corruption
initiatives to operate in addition to the transparency
requirements of a multilateral agreement.
Another example of the need to tailor multilateral
rules on procurement to the needs of a particular
country is provided by the example of unbundling
of contracts. Unbundling is a process whereby
major contracts are divided into several sub-units
to help smaller, possibly marginalised, suppliers to
engage in mainstream contracting. One country to
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Table 1: Types of pro-development discriminatory government procurement
Scheme type Methods Actions associated with the method
Reservation 1. Set-asides Allow only enterprises that have prescribed
characteristics to compete for the contracts or portions 
thereof, which have been reserved for their exclusive
execution.
2. Qualification criteria Exclude firms that cannot meet a specified requirement,
or norm, relating to the policy objective from
participation in contracts other than those provided for 
in the law.
3. Contractual conditions Make policy objectives a contractual condition, e.g. a
fixed percentage of work must be sub-contracted out to
enterprises that have prescribed characteristics or a joint 
venture must be entered into.
4. Offering back Offer tenderers that satisfy criteria relating to policy 
objectives an opportunity to undertake the whole or part 
of the contract if that tenderer is prepared to match the
price and quality of the best tender received.
Preferencing 5. Preferences at the Limit the number of suppliers/service providers who are 
shortlisting stage invited to tender on the basis of qualifications and give a 
weighting to policy objectives along with the usual
commercial criteria, such as quality, at the shortlisting 
stage.
6. Award criteria (tender Give a weighting to policy objectives along with the
evaluation criteria) usual commercial criteria, such as price and quality, at 
the award stage.
Indirect 7. Product/service State requirements in product or service specifications
specification e.g. by specifying labour-based construction methods.
8. Design of specifications, Design specifications and/or set contract terms to
contract conditions and facilitate participation by targeted groups of suppliers.
procurement processes to
benefit particular contractors
Supply-side 9. General assistance Provide support for targeted groups to compete for 
business, without giving these parties any favourable 
treatment in the actual procurement.
Source: Watermeyer (2002).
employ this mechanism is South Africa, where the
apartheid history necessitates steps to assist those
disadvantaged by the past. One of the recognised
mechanisms used by the South African
government as a means of assisting previously
marginalised players is the unbundling of state
contracts, also known as “break-out procurement”.
To see how such a policy could easily fall foul of
future multilateral rules, consider how such
regulations might be applied differentially
according to contract size. De minimis provisions
are well recognised in the WTO. It has been
suggested, for example, that smaller contracts
should be excluded from the scope of any
agreement or, if included, should have less
burdensome procurement requirements. But if
such thresholds are included in an agreement there
will be a positive obligation on member states to
avoid deliberate evasion. It would not be
unreasonable to require them to avoid the
deliberate splitting up of large contracts so as to
bring each one under the value threshold, and to
include this positive obligation in their legislation.
While necessarily hypothetical, this example is not
implausible, and it demonstrates how a WTO
requirement, perfectly reasonable in itself, could
undermine the desirable development objectives of
a government. This is because a government which
chooses to employ unbundling strategies for
development purposes will specifically aim to
award many small contracts instead of a few major
ones. How are these governments to deal with
“one-size-fits-all” threshold requirements that may
be negotiated into a multilateral agreement? This
would be a clear candidate for SDT provisions, but
how would they be framed? It would not be
difficult to adopt provisions that apply just to
contract unbundling, but the reasonable
assumption is that this is just the tip of an iceberg.
There will be other, less easily recognised, areas in
which a potential conflict could arise.
The issue of unbundling is just one example of how
discriminatory government procurement can be used
to achieve socio-economic goals.Watermeyer (2002)
identifies nine implementation methods (Table 1).
A brief glance indicates that there are advantages
and disadvantages attached to each method. The
choice will depend on factors such as the socio-
economic goals to be addressed, the ability of
officials properly to adjudicate tenders, the extent to
which cost-effectiveness is to be sacrificed, and how
far beneficiaries of the scheme are able to exploit the
advantages. Set-asides, for example, are easy for
officials to understand and introduce, simple to
explain to tenderers and transparent; but they may
be the least cost effective, the least competitive and
the least equitable. For a country determined to
preference directly one group of people regardless
of the additional costs, set-asides may present the
best option. But a country concerned about cost
and competitiveness, with a public sector capable of
properly adjudicating tenders, may find the use of
preferential award criteria better suited.
Given this diversity of cost-effectiveness, any
multilateral rules need to be framed sufficiently
broadly to allow developing members to choose
the most suitable form. This will be a challenge.
But, in fact, the difficulty in identifying rules that
are both sufficiently precise to be binding and
adequately flexible may be even greater than is
suggested by Table 1. These nine discriminatory
mechanisms do not necessarily encapsulate all of
the subtle, often opaque, forms of discrimination.
The reality is so complex that discrimination is
often not amenable to rules-based regulation.
3.3 Discrimination and transparency in
practice
The process of procuring goods, services or works is
often a lengthy, staged one that allows many entry
points for discrimination and a lack of transparency.
This can be seen more clearly by breaking the
process into three stages:
1. The invitation stage (sometimes referred to as
the enquiry).
2. The adjudication stage (sometimes referred to
as evaluation).
3. The execution stage.
Since it is beyond the ambit of an article to discuss
all possible discriminatory mechanisms, this
section discusses a few of the more important and
representative.
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Discrimination at the invitation stage
Is an open invitation made to all interested
suppliers or to only some? Article VII of the GPA
distinguishes three different types of invitation:
n the ‘open’ invitation, to which ‘all interested
suppliers may submit a tender’;
n the ‘selective’ invitation, to which only ‘those
suppliers invited to do so by the entity may
submit a tender’, and
n the ‘limited’ invitation, where the entity
‘contacts suppliers individually’.
In addition, the government may use the
mechanism of set-asides to direct certain work for
a (named) class of person.5
While set-asides and all but the open form of
invitation are clearly discriminatory, they are
transparent and overt. This makes them relatively
amenable to rules-based regulation. It is fairly
straightforward to regulate the circumstances when
selective or limited tenders will (not) be allowed.
Also, monitoring how contracts are invited ought
not to be too difficult. This amenability to
regulation is reflected in the GPA, which has very
neat rules regulating when selective and limited
tendering procedures may be used.6
For many suppliers the tidy regulation of open,
selective and limited tenders provides cold comfort
in the face of the less overt and far more costly forms
of discrimination that may be employed. At least an
excluded supplier does not go through the time-
consuming and expensive process of preparing a bid,
unaware that some other, covert form of
discrimination is operating to prevent it being
accepted. Where bidders find themselves preparing
numerous futile bids, there is a real danger that prices
for the supplies being offered may increase as bidders
factor preparation cost into the prices of those jobs
that are won. Thus, not only do these mechanisms
prevent a particular supplier from accessing amarket
on an equal footing, but they could also increase the
world price for the goods or services being supplied.
Less overt discrimination techniques include drafting
the technical specifications of the work in such a
manner as to ensure that only a limited number of
suppliers are able to meet them or to make it more
costly for certain suppliers than for others. Another
more covert mechanism is the manipulation of time
periods for the submission of tenders. They may be
made so short as to reduce the number of tenderers
who can meaningfully participate. Another,
potentially discriminatory mechanism is the choice
of contract document. A proliferation can seriously
hamper would-be suppliers: the allocation of risk
between different contracts may mean that tenderers
who are unfamiliar with a particular form are at a
disadvantage.
Regulation of these mechanisms is very difficult at
the national level and could prove well-nigh
impossible at a multilateral level. In attempting to
develop multilateral rules to prevent the more subtle
forms of discrimination negotiators may need to
tread a very fine line. Rules that are too prescriptive
could bring unwanted side-effects, while those that
are too flexible could render their effect nugatory. An
agreement, for example, that prevents overly
technical specifications could open the door to
greater abuse by officials who are granted increased
discretion through vague specifications. If time
periods for the submission of tenders are too long
they could interfere with budgetary cycles and
financial planning by procuring agencies. It would
surely be overly prescriptive to limit the forms of
contract that procuring entities may employ.
Some of these difficulties are clear from the somewhat
vague, aspirational wording of the GPA provisions on
technical specifications. This code provides, in Article
VI, para. 1, that: ‘Technical specifications laying down
the characteristics of the products or services to be
procured ... shall not be prepared, adopted or applied
with a view to, or with the effect of, creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.’ It goes
on to provide, in para. 2 of the same Article, that:
Technical specifications prescribed by procuring
entities shall, where appropriate: (a) be in terms of
performance rather than design or descriptive
characteristics; and (b) be based on international
standards, where such exist; otherwise, on
national technical regulations, recognized
national standards, or building codes.7
The prohibition is framed in very broad terms,
focusing on the intention and the effect of the
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specifications rather than the nuts and bolts of
what is and what is not to be allowed. To be more
specific is to run the risk of unwanted side-effects.
Discrimination at the evaluation stage
The evaluation stage of procurement is ripe with
opportunities for discrimination. The tender
documents may have provided for a price
preference to be allocated to named classes of
suppliers at expressed percentages. Alternatively,
the preferencing may, as in the South African case,
be provided for in legislation8 or in the contract
specifications.9 The prospective suppliers may be
made aware of the preferencing: the formula used
to calculate the preference and the class of people
to be preferenced. In such a case the system, while
discriminatory, is transparent. But other, less
transparent, mechanisms may be employed. These
include the elimination of any tender that does not,
in the opinion of the official, meet the formal
requirements for the tender. Clearly, the more
complex, technically specific and prescriptive the
tender documents, the easier it will be for an
official to reject a tender on the basis of non-
compliance. In the most opaque circumstances,
officials may discriminate at this stage by awarding
tenders as they see fit, independent of any rules,
regulations or guidelines.
Discrimination during the execution stage10
Most of the disciplines suggested by the WGTGP
and GPA are aimed at transparency in one of the
two earlier stages of procurement, probably since
any discrimination which occurs during the
execution stage is both difficult to track and hard to
remedy. But the discriminatory mechanisms
employed at this stage should not be ignored,
particularly since they illustrate some of the
difficulties encountered in attempting to regulate
government procurement. One device employed at
this stage to prefer one supplier over another is
differential “bailing out”.
The most widely recognised circumstance for bailing
out is when the government client agrees to assist a
supplier who has bid too low and finds, during the
execution, that he is unable to fulfil the contract due
to financial constraints. This commonly occurs in
the construction industry when contractors
underbid at the tender stage. When the contractor
realises that he cannot possibly make a profit on the
contract he is often tempted to abscond or to declare
insolvency, leaving the client with incomplete works.
The government client, faced with this situation can
do one of two things. The first option is to refuse to
bail the contractor out. While this may be the most
contractually sound route, it is often not the most
cost effective. The client now has to re-invite
tenders, and may well find that new bidders, wary of
the risks associated with completing someone else’s
(possibly defective) work and aware that the client
may now be under severe time constraints, submit
inflated bids. Many government clients faced with
this situation choose the second option, and bail the
incumbent contractor out by agreeing to finance the
completion of the works. This process is often
justifiable in the interests of completing the works in
the shortest time and at the lowest cost.
A second, less overt bailing out practice, common
in government contracts in South Africa, occurs
when officials choose to turn a blind eye to a failure
by the contractor to meet his contractual
obligations for broader developmental reasons. An
example of this is in the construction industry
where standard contracts often provide that the
contractor will be entitled to additional time and/or
additional money if (but only if) certain notice
requirements are satisfied within a specified time
period. In South Africa, where the Department of
Public Works has spearheaded a campaign to
advance “emerging contractors”, it is common for
officials to waive the notice requirements should
unsophisticated contractors fail to serve notices in
circumstances where they would, otherwise, be
entitled to claim additional time or money.
Similarly, officials often choose to waive the
government’s right to claim liquidated damages
where “emerging contractors” fail to complete on
time. The same assistance is not always offered to
established contractors, since officials do not
necessarily feel the need to assist.
These two forms of bailing out raise different
issues. The first case is the more straightforward,
since bailing out may serve the financial interests of
the state; the official who chooses not to bail out
could cause additional cost to the state. It is
therefore in keeping with sound financial
management and competition. In the second case,
by contrast, the decision to bail out is in direct
conflict with the financial rights of the state, in the
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short term at least. The decision to waive is not cost
effective but is in keeping with the development
agenda of the government.
Differential treatment may lead to effective
discrimination. Potential suppliers may track the
bailing out patterns of particular governments or
departments and decide that the risk of not being
bailed out is too high. Thus, one tenderer may
submit a reasonable bid, which covers all the
requirements of the works on the assumption that
he will not be bailed out. Another may submit a
bid, which is too low, secure in the knowledge that
he will be bailed out should he find himself in
financial difficulties.
Bailing out presents an interesting challenge to
procurement regulation. It occurs after the contract
has been awarded, and once the works are
progressing. For tenderers to cry foul at this stage
is usually ineffective and could prejudice future
relations with the client. Also, it may be very
difficult to separate the bailing out that serves a
justifiable developmental or financial interest from
that which serves a self-serving, corrupt interest.
4 Rules-based regulation of
procurement
The scenarios painted above illustrate a mere
handful of the discriminatory practices in which
officials may engage. Governments have a wealth of
discriminatory practices to choose from, and some
are more cost effective or more transparent or more
equitable than others.
Most importantly, these examples illustrate the
intensity of intervention required if transparency
and non-discrimination were truly to be ensured.
Regulation would have to refer to the minutiae of
procurement practices and would require
monitoring of every stage of procurement at an
extremely close level. The experience of other
WTO agreements suggests that such tight
regulation is unlikely, at least across the board.
Furthermore, such tight regulation may not be
desirable given the wide range of approaches to
procurement reform. In the absence of any clear
guidance from the WTO fora, this article assesses
the implications of the two extreme alternatives: a
very precise regime that might remove
discrimination but at the cost of a heavy burden of
compliance, and a looser regime that would leave
developing countries as victims of opaque or
discriminatory practices by other member states.
In practice, any regime on discrimination might
have elements of both extremes: highly detailed
provisions in some areas and only general principles
in others. This would not avoid the problems. The
detailed sections could make developing countries
vulnerable to challenge in dispute settlement with
respect to their own policies. And even broad rules
might create problems. Take the example of the
South African constitution.
The relevant section of the South African
constitution (s.217) was cited in Section 3.1.
The wording of sub-sections (1) and (2) is probably
sufficiently broad and aspirational to accommodate
the terms of a multilateral agreement. Sub-section
(3), however, is more problematic. This sub-section
clearly calls for national legislation, which
prescribes a framework – and only a framework –
within which the policies must be implemented.
Legislation must not completely tie the hands of
procuring officials, but must provide them with a
framework within which they are allowed to
exercise discretion and make choices.
This provision for administrative latitude is by no
means accidental. The awarding of contracts is, by
and large, a function of the administrative arm of
government. While this function can be regulated
by legislation, a certain amount of discretion is
vested in the administrative officials who are
responsible for budgets and spending.
This broad, framework approach to the regulation
of procurement would surely be at odds with a
highly technical, particular approach in a
multilateral agreement, even in only one part of
that agreement. Can the South African constitution
accommodate a situation where national legislation
prescribes more than simply a framework? It seems
that the South African scenario may be an extreme
one, where amendment to the constitution could
be required rather than amendment of legislation.
Given the improbability of a highly detailed,
prescriptive WTO agreement, the example is
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provided to illustrate a systemic problem. Even if a
WTO accord provided only a few tight provisions,
it could still create a need to amend the South
African constitution’s requirement that the law
provide only a framework.
4.1 Administrative burden of
compliance
Deliberations in theWGTGP have considered some
of the detailed points in which discrimination
could arise. They have raised, for example, the
possibility of governments debriefing unsuccessful
tenderers, providing detailed information on
contract awards, reasons for the award, up-to-date
information on procurement laws and regulations,
etc. While all of these may well be desirable,
compliance could place heavy burdens on an
under-resourced administration.
To illustrate this point, consider two of the issues
identified by the WGTGP’s List of Issues Raised and
Points Made:
n publication of information on procurement
opportunities and on rules, regulations and
laws governing procurement, and
n information on procurement opportunities,
tendering and qualification procedures.
It would be hard not to argue that the publication of
information on procurement opportunities and on
rules, regulations and laws governing procurement
is a cornerstone of transparency. The question is
what level of publication will be called for and what
a particular administration can realistically offer to
provide. The burden of compliance will differ
between countries, as will the capacity to fulfil. In
South Africa, there exists a highly decentralised and
flexible system. Each organ of state, of which there
are hundreds, is free to determine its preferencing
policies as long as this is done within a prescribed
framework.11 The administrative burden and
financial cost of collecting and publishing each of
the policies of each state organ would be immense,
not least because any publication would have to be
updated regularly.
Even if this burden is shouldered, other member
states may attain little more than the belief that they
understand the procurement regime applied in
South Africa. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
policies that have been put in place by various
organs of state diverge quite widely
(notwithstanding the framework) and that many
organs of state either have no policy or do not
follow the one that they have. A recent report
(Manchidi and Harmond 2002) into the impact of
the targeted procurement specifications employed
by the South African Department of Public Works
for seven years12 found itself unable to make an
accurate assessment of the effect due to the absence
of uniform procedures and reliable information.
This report, interestingly, ends up by relying on
anecdotal evidence and drawing conclusions that
are necessarily limited as a result. The constraints to
accurate assessment identified by the report were:
n reliable and consistent data were limited, and
the available data were often unsubstantiated;
n some procuring entities have made efforts to
capture data on tender awards but different
entities have used different mechanisms, thus
making it difficult to compare like with like;
n while there are statutory instruments
regulating procurement, some entities
introduced these instruments late;13
n there is a lack of policy evaluation tools;
n researchers found limited information on
supply-side interventions.
The report concludes that:
Even National Treasury, which is the guardian of
the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework
Act and Public Finance Management Act does
not have comprehensive instruments to monitor
and evaluate performance. The current [State
Tender Board] instrument does not capture
goods awarded by departments, provinces, local
governments and other organs of state
(Manchidi and Harmond 2002: 25).
Even if a country were able to comply, the
introduction of onerous technical procurement
disciplines could be counter-productive. In South
Africa, for example, a much publicised concern is
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under-spending by the public sector. In the period
April 2000–January 2001, for example, both the
Department of Housing and the Department of
Health spent less than half of their allocated capital
expenditure budgets (SAFCEC, quoted in Dept of
Public Works 2002). A key reason appears to be a
lack of capacity to manage complex, difficult
procurement processes. This paralysis will not be
eased by additional onerous, highly technical
procurement procedures.
4.2 Benefits for developing countries of
a multilateral agreement
While developing countries stand to gain directly
from domestic procurement reform, they will gain
from this being linked to multilateral rules only if
the link facilitates domestic reform (on which the
foregoing analysis casts doubt) or if the adherence
of other states to the reform is beneficial. The most
obvious way in which the second of these might
apply is from the opening of new markets for
developing country exports. How likely is it that a
WTO regime will open markets? There are two
areas of doubt. First, there is no guarantee that a
multilateral agreement will prevent discrimination
(as explained above), and other barriers could
prevent developing countries from exploiting even
truly open procurement markets.
The message from Doha is clear and unequivocal:
multilateral talks will not be aimed at discrimination
but at transparency. The “gains” for developing
countries of opening new markets will therefore not
occur as a result of the type of multilateral agreement
that Doha envisages.14 Even so, it could be argued
that the mere fact that tendering opportunities
become transparent, published and available to all
will lead to a degree of market opening. This
argument has merit only if two requirements are
satisfied: developing countries have the resources to
track the opportunities (which, clearly, some do but
some do not), and are not prevented from exploiting
them by discriminatory practices that fall outside the
WTO regulations.
Non procurement-related barriers
What sorts of discriminatory barrier do suppliers
from developing countries face? To provide an
illustration, I have chosen the South African
construction industry.15 A large percentage of the
South African procurement market is construction
related.16 The South African construction industry
has been something of a guinea pig on a number of
government initiatives that extend price
preferences and other potentially discriminatory
preferences to certain groups of contractors. It is
represented by relatively well-organised industry
bodies, which have put considerable effort into
gathering information on the industry at home and
abroad. The South African construction industry is
already exporting construction works quite widely
and it therefore stands to gain from any
liberalisation of international trade. Finally,
construction services are to be negotiated in this
round of negotiations on trade in services and some
of the issues discussed here may be relevant to
those negotiations.
An April 2002 report of The South African
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors
(SAFCEC 2002) shows that South African
construction companies are exporting to the
following countries:
n in Africa: Angola, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe;
n in the Middle and Far East: Abu Dhabi; Dubai,
India, Turkey, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia;
n in South America: Argentina and Brazil.
A glance shows that we are dealing predominantly
with developing countries, even though the South
African construction industry is relatively
sophisticated, globally competitive and bolstered
by a weak currency.Much of the construction work
undertaken in these countries will be financed by
funding agencies such as the World Bank or the
EU, which apply their own procurement
requirements. These may serve as effective barriers
to entry by firms from “the wrong country”.
In such cases, multilateral regulation of
government procurement, however effective, is
either irrelevant or is a sledgehammer to crack a
nut. If it excludes aid procurement it is irrelevant.
If WTO members are willing to untie aid, then the
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gains for developing countries of increased market
access can be achieved much more easily than via a
WTO accord on government procurement. How
much simpler to untie aid procurement (perhaps
through the OECD) than to attempt a multilateral
agreement, and, for many developing countries,
how much more effective.
Even in an aid programme that does not serve
protectionist ends, like that of theWorld Bank, there
may be problems. The World Bank (1999) lists five
“basic concerns” that govern its procurement
policies, with a tension between two of them:17
n to give all qualified bidders from the Bank’s
member countries an equal opportunity to
compete for Bank-financed contracts;
n to encourage development of local contractors
and manufacturers in borrowing countries.
While the former will allow firms from most
developing countries to tender since they are Bank
member countries, the latter raises the spectre of
discrimination, which may or may not be mitigated
by transparency requirements.
Procurement policies, narrowly defined, are not the
only obstacles to trade. One common complaint is
that restrictions over the movement of persons are a
non-tariff barrier to trade. The SAFCEC Export
Committee has found that South African
construction companies doing work abroad source
about 30 per cent of staff in South Africa and move
them on to the projects.Most of these staff members
are key management and skilled workers who are
familiar with the firm’s project management
systems, technical methodologies and
implementation requirements. A firm could be
seriously prejudiced if it found itself prevented from
moving these people through visa requirements,
residence requirements or other barriers.
Similarly, many construction contracts require the
cross-border movement of plant and equipment.
SAFCEC reports that plant and equipment supply
companies estimate that 80 per cent of new plant
bought in South Africa is taken out of the country
for use in fulfilling foreign contracts. Aside from the
non trade-related, logistical problems presented by
such movements, construction companies may face
barriers in the form of import permits, licences,
health and safety requirements and the like.
Finally, it is not only procurement regulations that
need to be transparent and non-discriminatory.
Exporters of construction services need an
understanding of local legislation, regulations on
health and safety issues, licensing of practitioners,
etc. Transparency in procurement regulations and
opportunities will help little if there is a lack of
transparency in all of these other areas. Indeed,
many of the serious obstacles faced by South
African exporters of construction works fall outside
the mandate of the WTO (Teljeur and Stern 2002).
5 Conclusion
It is not surprising that the WTO is directing its
attention towards government procurement reform
and the possibility of multilateral talks on
procurement matters. Many other agencies are also
advising procurement reform and many developing
countries are either currently reforming their
procurement systems or are planning to do so. The
question is not so much whether procurement
reform is needed as it is which reform measures
should be taken and with what goal in mind.
Answering these questions is a prior requirement
to the framing of appropriate SDT.
Given that the Doha Declaration expressly excludes
discrimination from the issues to be included in a
multilateral agreement, it is appropriate to consider,
first, what SDT is required in an agreement on
transparency. Here the issue is not one of development
desirability: other things being equal, a transparent
procurement regime is “a good thing”. The problem is
a likely disproportion between costs and benefits.
Substantial transparency could easily be costly to
supply. In the light of other (possibly non WTO-
related) barriers to exports from developing countries,
the benefits of a multilateral agreement limited to
transparency could be greatly outweighed by the
administrative cost of compliance. A very light
transparency regime limited to general principles
would reduce the problem, but the question then arises
as to whether it would serve any useful purpose. One
potential purpose would be to provide the foundations
for more ambitious, subsequent rule-making. In this
case, however, it would be wise for the SDT provisions
to be incorporated from the outset into the foundations.
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If a WTO regime were to move beyond
transparency (either in this Round or a subsequent
one), what form would best suit developing
country needs? Ideally, developing countries
should use the Doha window to establish what
they hope to achieve through procurement reform
and, from this, how a WTO regime might help or
hinder. In practice, of course, this may not happen,
and so it is desirable to develop, in parallel, a list of
the potential pro- and anti-development features of
multilateral rules aiming to limit discrimination in
public procurement.
Three arguments frequently advanced in favour of
a multilateral regime are that:
1. ex ante it acts as a catalyst, increasing the
influence of domestic lobbies seeking reform,
and therefore makes it more likely that reform
will take place;
2. ex post it locks in domestic reform and, hence,
instils confidence in economic operators which,
in turn, enhances the positive impact of reform;
3. it offers the “carrot” of improved access to
export markets to offset the political pressure
generated by domestic suppliers who fear
increased competition.
Given the incoherence of the WTO debate, it is not
clear how it could play the ex ante role at the
present time. If things are to change it appears
more likely that they will do so as a result of
governance and public administration debates
within countries rather than at Geneva.
Again, WTO disciplines are unlikely to provide
convincing ex post locking in; at least for the
foreseeable future. There are so many ways in
which officials can discriminate, and the prospect
of a similarly precise and detailed set of WTO rules
appears to be remote.
In these circumstances, it could be argued, the
most developmentally friendly early plurilateral or
multilateral rules would be those that:
n provide improved access for developing
country exports;
n impose few demands in terms of reporting and
procedures that go beyond the public sector
reforms that developing country WTOmembers
intend to introduce for domestic reasons.
A first step would be for all OECD states to untie
procurement of their aid contracts. This need not
occur in theWTO, although it could be linked. For
example, if the OECD states were willing to untie,
but wished to use this as a lever to encourage
improved practice by developing countries, the
WTO negotiations could be used to identify codes
of “good practice”. These would be non-binding in
terms of WTO dispute settlement, but could be
used in the autonomous actions of the aid donors
to justify extending procurement to some
developing countries and not to others.
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Notes
1. The other two negotiating mandates being:
emergency safeguard measures under Article X of
GATS; and subsidies under Article XV of GATS.
2. Emphasis added.
3. The potential administrative burdens are discussed
in Section 4.1.
4. This sub-section initially read ‘within which the
policy referred to in subsection (2) may be
implemented’. The word ‘may’ was changed to ‘must’
by the Second Amendment Act 61 of 2001.
5. The South African Department of Housing used this
mechanism to set aside certain housing contracts for
female contractors only.
6. See Article X, paragraph 3, and Article XV.
7. Emphasis added.
8. The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act
5 of 2000 provides for a preferencing in the ratio of
90:10 for contracts valued at above a prescribed
amount (currently R500,000, or about US$50,000)
and a contract ratio of 80:20 for contracts below this
amount, where the 10 and 20 points are allocated to
preferencing criteria.
9. See, for example, the Targeted Procurement
Specifications published by the South African
Department of Public Works in 1995.
10. Some would argue that the term “procurement”
covers only the invitation and adjudication stages.
Such a limited definition does not, to my mind,
capture the full process of procuring goods or
services.
11. Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of
2000 and accompanying regulations of August 2001.
12. These specifications introduce a price preferencing
through the contract specifications. The system has a
high degree of transparency in that formulae for the
allocation of price preferences, criteria in
adjudication and other factors are all freely available
to tenderers in both hard copy and electronic form.
13. It is my experience that some entities have yet to
introduce these instruments, while others consider
themselves not obliged to do so.
14. The considerations will clearly be different should
the ambit of multilateral negotiations be extended so
as to include discrimination, or should it prove
impossible to separate the two.
15. In choosing this sector, I realise that the problems
experienced by the exporters of construction works
will not necessarily be shared by other exporters.
Exporters may experience more, fewer or different
barriers.
16. Investment in construction-related goods by the
public and private sectors has averaged just under 3
per cent of national output for most of the 1990s,
with a significant contribution by the organs of the
state (Manchidi and Merrifield 2001).
17. The World Bank’s other three “basic concerns” are:
(1) to ensure that the goods and services needed to
carry out the project are procured with due attention
to economy and efficiency; (2) to ensure that the
loan is used to buy only those goods and services
needed to carry out the project; and (3) to ensure
that the procurement process is transparent.
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